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Abstract 
This paper presents new evidence on the patterns of price and wage adjustment in 
European firms and on the extent of nominal rigidities. It uses a unique dataset collected 
through a firm-level survey conducted in a broad range of countries and covering various 
sectors. Several conclusions are drawn from this evidence. Firms adjust wages less 
frequently than prices: the former tend to remain unchanged for about 15 months on 
average, the latter for around 10 months. The degree of price rigidity varies substantially 
across sectors and depends strongly on economic features, such as the intensity of 
competition, the exposure to foreign markets and the share of labour costs in total cost. 
Instead, country specificities, mostly related to the labour market’s institutional setting, are 
more relevant in characterising the pattern of wage adjustment. The latter also exhibits a 
substantial degree of time-dependence, as firms tend to concentrate wage changes in a 
specific month, mostly January in the majority of countries. Wage and price changes feed 
into each other at the micro level and there is a relationship between wage and price 
rigidity. 
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Introduction 
This paper studies the frequency, timing and interaction of wage and price changes across 
firms, covering several economic sectors and a broad range of European countries. It provides new  
micro-founded evidence for models of wage and price staggering that have become very popular in 
New Keynesian DSGE models. The important role of labour markets in generating price rigidity in 
structural models is discussed for instance in Altissimo et al. (2006). By incorporating real wage 
rigidities, i.e. the slow adjustment of real wages to underlying market conditions, in the framework 
of a New Keynesian Philips Curve, these models seem to fit better the data. Approaching the 
analysis of price and wage dynamics simultaneously can also shed light on the impact of recent 
changes in labour market institutions on wage and labour cost dynamics. For example, it can 
provide useful insights on the sources behind the substantial degree of wage moderation observed in 
a number of European countries, which in turn could be potentially useful in terms of implications 
for monetary policy and structural reform. 
This paper uses a new and unique cross-country dataset – unprecedented by international 
standards in terms of both geographical and sectoral coverage – based on an ad-hoc survey on wage 
and pricing policies at the firm level. The survey was developed within the Wage Dynamics 
Network (WDN), a research network grouping 23 central banks in the EU and coordinated by the 
European Central Bank. It was carried out by 17 national central banks (12 of which belonging to 
the euro area and 5 new EU member states) between the end of 2007 and the first half of 2008, on 
the basis of a harmonised questionnaire that aimed at uncovering specific features of firm’s price 
and wage setting policies and their relationships.  Overall, more than 17,000 firms were 
interviewed, belonging to different size classes and operating in different sectors of the economy. 
The uniqueness of this survey is at least twofold. First, its country coverage: given the large 
heterogeneity of labour markets across European countries, the harmonised questionnaire allows to 
widen our understanding of the effects of different labour market institutions and policies in price 
and wage setting practices. Second, the scope and richness of the information collected. In addition 
to collecting information on both price and wage setting and adjustments, the survey collects 
information on firm’s characteristics such as the sector of activity, its size, the structure of the 
product market in which it operates, the intensity of competitive pressures on this market, the 
structure of its labour force and institutional features potentially affecting its wage and labour 
policies.   
The use of surveys to investigate pricing policies was pioneered by the seminal work of 
Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. (1998) and led to similar analyses in other countries as well as in 
the euro area, in the context of a previous research network grouping central banks of the 
Eurosystem, the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN; for the results, see Fabiani et al., 2007). The 
survey on which this paper is based can be regarded as the “natural” follow-up to some of the 
evidence on price behaviour revealed by the IPN (Altissimo et al., 2006; Fabiani et al., 2007). 
Indeed one of the most interesting finding of studies based on micro quantitative and survey data 
(see Alvarez et al., 2006; Dhyne et al., 2007; Vermeulen, et al., 2007; Fabiani et al., 2006) is the 
substantial heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness across products and sectors, related 
among many other factors to the variability of input costs and the cost structure at the firm and 
sectoral level. This evidence, albeit anecdotic, raises the question of whether the observed 
dispersion in the frequency of price changes is the result of wage inertial behaviour, placing firms’ 
wage setting policies at the heart of our research interests. 
In the existing literature, surveys focused on wage setting at the firm level are mostly aimed at 
disentangling the existence and the reasons of downward wage rigidity; seminal works in this field 
are those by Blinder and Choi (1990), Agell and Lundborg (2003), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) 
and Franz and Pfeiffer (2006). This paper enriches this line of research by exploring other 
dimensions of wage setting, focusing explicitly on how firms set and adjust prices and wages and   6 
on the relationship between wage and pricing policies and adjustments.1 In particular, it aims at 
providing answers to the following questions: (i) How often are prices and base wages changed in 
Europe? Are adjustments synchronized or not and do they tend to take place in specific months of 
the year?  (ii) Are there significant differences across firms, sectors and countries regarding the 
frequency and timing of wage and price changes and their relationship? If such differences are 
indeed present, how do they eventually relate to institutional and structural features such as the 
nature of wage negotiations, the presence of forms of indexation of wages to prices, the intensity of 
competitive pressures, the structure of the workforce, or the labour intensity of production as 
suggested by the IPN results? 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 1 briefly presents the WDN survey and the 
data collected. Section 2 focuses on descriptive evidence on the frequency and timing of price and 
wage changes at the firm level, their relationship and the variation across countries and sectors. 
Section 3 investigates, within a multivariate econometric analysis, the role of various explanatory 
factors of price and wage changes at the firm level. Section 4 summarizes the main findings. 
1  Data and sample 
The data used for this paper is a subset of the dataset collected by the WDN survey. It 
concentrates on 15 countries for which fully harmonised data are available; namely: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Although the national surveys were organized 
and carried out by each national central bank, the questionnaire and the target population of firms 
were very similar across countries. A “core questionnaire” was developed in a co-coordinated 
fashion within the WDN and was adopted by all participant countries with at most minor 
modifications.2 Country-level micro data were pooled together into a common dataset. It covers 
firms employing more than 5 employees and operating in manufacturing, construction and services 
(trade, market services and financial intermediation).3 
Sample size, sampling probabilities and non-response patterns vary across countries as well as 
across sectors and firms’ size within countries. In general, studies based on survey data need to 
handle this heterogeneity. We adopt employment-adjusted weights, where the weight attached to 
each firm in the sample refers to how many employees that observation represents in the 
population.4 
Tables 1 and 2 present the sample composition by country, sector and firm size. Table 2 also 
shows the distribution based on the number of employees represented by the sample. The total 
number of firms is just below 15,000, representing almost 48 million employees. By design, the 
                                                 
1   Other studies produced in the context of the WDN investigate different dimensions of the survey. Babecky et al. 
(2008) focus on nominal and real wage rigidity by examining not only the issue of flexibility in base wages but also 
alternative margins of labour costs adjustment at the firm level. Bertola et al. (2008) analyse firms’ dominant 
adjustment strategies in reaction to unanticipated changes in demand, costs and wages and investigate some possible 
determinants underlying this choice. Galuscak et al. (2008) deal with the issue of wages of newly hired workers and 
investigate the relative importance of internal, external and institutional factors in this particular market. 
2   An exception is Germany, where the data collected are not fully comparable. This explains why Germany is not 
included in our sample. 
3   See Appendix 1 for details on the survey and on national samples and Appendix 2 for the questionnaire. Questions 
labelled as “non-core” refer to those questions that countries had the option not to include in their national 
questionnaires. 
4   The weights are defined as the sum of all employees in the population in a sampling category (by country, sector, 
firm size category, perhaps region) divided by the number of observations (firms) in that category. They can also be 
thought of as the product of three fractions: the intended sampling probability, the response rate, and employees per 
firm. They add up to total employment in the population the sample represents.   7 
sample is relatively balanced across firm size categories, and its sectoral distribution closely follows 
that of employment. 
 
Table 1 – Sample composition by country 
















Total  14,940 100
 
Table 2 – Sample composition by sector and size  
and the employment population represented 
(a) Number of observations 
 5-19  20-49  50-199 >200  Total 
Number of firms: 
Manufacturing 887  1,271  2,267  1,778  6,203 
Construction 378  312  337  114  1,141 
Trade 1,189  737  793  362  3,081 
Market services  1,350  1,060  1,045  726  4,181 
Financial services  108  35  78  113  334 
Total  3,912 3,415  4,520 3,093  14,940 
Employees (thousands): 
Manufacturing 2209  4202  5124  7793  19328 
Construction 832  605  657  341  2435 
Trade 2928  2496  1971  2405  9800 
Market services  2545  2638  3056  6797  15036 
Financial services  162  86  255  531  1034 
Total  8677 10026  11063 17867  47633 
(b) Percentages 
5-19 20-49 50-199 >200 Total
Number of firms: 
Manufacturing 5.9 8.5 15.2 11.9 41.5
Construction 2.5 2.1 2.3 0.8 7.6
Trade 8.0 4.9 5.3 2.4 20.6
Market services  9.0 7.1 7.0 4.9 28.0
Financial services  0.7 0.2 0.5 0.8 2.2
Total  26.2 22.9 30.3 20.7 100
Employees:  
Manufacturing 4.6 8.8 10.8 16.4 40.6
Construction 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.7 5.1
Trade 6.1 5.2 4.1 5.0 20.6
Market services  5.3 5.5 6.4 14.3 31.6
Financial services  0.3 0.2 0.5 1.1 2.2
Total  18.2 21.0 23.2 37.5 100
 
An advantage of this survey is that firms were directly asked about a number of features 
referring to the institutional setup within the firm or to the environment where it operates (e.g. the 
degree of competition or the existence of a policy at the firm level that adjusts wages to inflation). 
Information on these features is rarely available in administrative and other datasets. On the other 
hand, the survey suffers from several shortcomings inherent in ad hoc surveys, such as low rates of 
response and potential misunderstandings in interpreting the questions. Moreover, results may be   8 
influenced by the specific economic situation prevailing in each country at that time interviews 
were carried out (around the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008).  
2  Price and wage adjustment: frequency, timing and interaction 
The adjustment mechanism of prices and wages followed by firms plays a crucial role on the 
transmission of economic shocks. In particular, the degree of price and wage rigidity determines the 
speed of adjustment of the economy and the amount of the related costs. A deep understanding of 
the extent and sources of rigidity is therefore of major importance for assessing the effects of 
monetary policy and calibrating macroeconomic models for policy analysis. 
Despite the relevance of the issue, available empirical evidence, comparable across countries 
and sectors, on the stickiness of wages is rather scarce. Concerning price adjustment, instead, 
studies conducted within the IPN revealed a somewhat high degree of stickiness in the euro area, as 
measured by the frequency of price changes, especially when compared to the United States. This 
finding was supported consistently by evidence based on both survey data (Fabiani et al. 2007) and 
quantitative micro consumer and producer price data (Dhyne et al. 2007; Vermeulen et al. 2007). 
Another important and robust result of these studies was the substantial heterogeneity of the 
frequency of price changes across products and sectors, which appears to be related, among other 
factors, to the variability in the cost structure at the firm and sectoral level, in particular in the 
relative importance of labour costs.
5 
The information on price and wage adjustment collected by the WDN survey contributes to 
fill the gap related to the lack of data on wage policies at the firm level and to address the issue of 
the degree of price and wage stickiness simultaneously. In the rest of this section we present some 
descriptive evidence on three different aspects related to this issue: i) the frequency of wage and 
price changes; ii) the prevailing mechanism of adjustment (time vs. state dependence) and its 
timing; and iii) the extent to which wage changes feed into price changes and vice versa. 
2.1  How often are prices and wages adjusted? 
The frequency of price and wage changes provides a rough measure of the extent of nominal 
rigidities which are, among other things, an essential ingredient in the calibration of standard DSGE 
models with staggered adjustment mechanisms that are widely used for monetary policy analysis 
(see, among others, Woodford, 2003, Gali et al. 2003, Smets and Wouters, 2003).  
On this issue, the WDN survey explicitly asked firms about the frequency of price changes for 
their main product (see Appendix 2, question 31) and of wage changes for their main occupational 
group (question 9). In the former case, firms could choose between the following range of 
categories: daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, twice a year, once a year, less frequently than once a 
year, other. The frequency of wage adjustment was instead tackled through three separate questions 
capturing different types of wage changes: those due to factors unrelated to tenure and/or inflation, 
those due to tenure and those due to inflation. The exact wording of the question in each case is the 
following: “How frequently is the base wage of an employee belonging to the main occupational 
group in your firm typically changed?”. Respondents could choose from the options: more than 
once a year; once a year; once every two years; less frequently than once every two years; never / 
don’t know. 
                                                 
5   Consumer price data and survey results show that prices are changed least often in the services sector. Producer 
price data suggest that the frequency of price changes is highest for those products that have not undergone many 
transformations and, hence, whose costs are closely linked to the typically rather volatile raw material prices. A 
similar heterogeneity across sectors is found in the United States.   9 
In the analysis of the answers concerning price setting, we aggregate the first three options, on 
the one hand, and the fourth and fifth, on the other, and end up with four categories: daily to 
monthly, quarterly to half-yearly, yearly and less frequent than yearly. As for wages, we aggregate 
the third and fourth categories into a single one, which we label as “less frequently than once a 
year”. In order to simplify the description of results, in the rest of this paper we consider a synthetic 
measure, defined as the highest frequency of firm-level wage change among the three types 
described above (due to factors unrelated to tenure and/or inflation, due to tenure; due to inflation). 
 
Table 3 - Frequency of price and wage changes across sectors 
(percentages) 
PRICES 
  Daily to monthly  quarterly to half yearly yearly less frequently than once a year  no pattern 
Total 9.2  15.4  39.2  7.4 28.5 
  Manufacturing  5.3  16.1  43.4  7.8  27.3 
  Construction  7.6  20.4  29.5  7.2  35.2 
  Trade  22.9  20.3  27.4  3.2  26.1 
  Market services  5.4  10.4  44.3  9.8  29.9 
  Financial services  14.8  18.4  23.0  5.4  36.7 
Standard deviation  7,6  4,1  9,7  2,5  4,7 
WAGES (for any reason) 
  more frequently than once a year  yearly less frequently than once a year  never/don't know
Total 12.1  59.5  25.6  2.9 
  Manufacturing  12.3  59.1  26.5  2.1 
  Construction  21.5  59.9  15.6  3.0 
  Trade  10.8  58.3  27.3  3.6 
  Market services  10.9  60.7  24.9  3.5 
  Financial services  15.6  59.8  23.1  1.5 
Standard deviation  4,5  0,9  4,7  0,9 
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show that in general price adjustments are more frequent than wage 
adjustments. About half of the firms change prices once a year or less frequently; a quarter do it 
more often, while the remaining ones do not report any particular pattern. Wages are changed less 
frequently: for 85 percent of firms once a year or less often, only for 12 percent more often. 
The disaggregation by sector and country reveals a substantially higher dispersion in the 
frequency of price adjustment across sectors than across countries, whereas the opposite is true in 
the case of wage adjustment. Firms in manufacturing and market services adjust prices much less 
often that those in trade and financial services, while construction is the sector with the highest 
fraction of firms reporting no regular pattern in price revisions (Table 3).6 As regards wages, the 
cross-sectoral variation is lower. Wage changes are least frequent in trade and business services, 
more frequent in manufacturing and most frequent in construction. Even in this latter sector, 
though, 60 percent of the firms report adjustments at the yearly frequency and only 22 percent at a 
higher frequency.7 
When looking at differences across countries, the top panel of Table 4 shows that the 
variability in the frequency of price changes is lower than across sectors. Poland, Lithuania, Ireland 
and the Netherlands are the countries with the highest fraction of firms revising prices more than 
once a year, whereas Hungary, Spain and France are those with the lowest; for the whole euro area, 
this fraction is 22 percent, about ten percentage points lower than for the non-euro area aggregate. 
                                                 
6   When interpreting the results concerning financial services, a note of caution regards, on the one hand, the concept 
of price, which might be difficult to capture for respondents, and, on the other, the fact that in most countries 
interviews were carried out in a period of exceptional turbulence on international financial markets. 
7   A comparable analysis has been done by size classes, as defined in Section 1. Differences in frequencies of price 
and wage changes by firms' size turn out to be negligible.    10  
Substantial cross-country variation is instead observed in the case of wages (bottom panel in  
Table 4). Lithuanian, Greek and Slovenian firms adjust base wages most frequently, followed by 
Belgium, France and Estonia, while Hungary, Italy and Portugal are the countries with the lowest 
fraction of firms changing wages more often than yearly. The modal frequency is one year in all 
countries except Italy and Lithuania. Despite the large differences across individual countries, the 
frequency distribution is broadly similar when one compares the euro-area and non-euro area 
aggregates. 
 
Table 4 - Frequency of price and wage changes across countries 
(percentages) 
PRICES 
  daily to 
monthly 
quarterly to 
half yearly  yearly less frequently 
than once a year no pattern 
Total 9.2  15.4  39.2  7.4  28.5 
Euro area  9.0  12.9  40.8  5.1  32.1 
Austria 11.6  13.2  37.3  4.9  32.9 
Belgium 8.5  12.2  43.9  6.1  28.9 
France 5.5  14.3  49.3  4.2  26.6 
Greece
1 3.6  18.2  40.8  6.6  30.8 
Ireland 14.8  15.4  33.6  6.7  29.1 
Italy 8.9  12.9  32.3  6.5  39.3 
Netherlands 12.7  16.0  44.4  5.6  21.4 
Portugal 7.9  12.2  44.2  2.1  33.6 
Slovenia 7.7  17.2  37.5  6.2  26.4 
Spain 10.4  7.7  47.3  3.1  31.2 
Non- Euro Area  9.9  22.5  35.0  13.6  18.6 
Czech Republic  9.7  12.6  36.3  8.5  32.7 
Estonia 5.1  18.4  32.5  8.8  34.7 
Hungary 6.1  10.3  45.2  8.6  28.0 
Lithuania 8.9  27.8  20.4  11.0  30.3 
Poland 11.1  27.7  34.2  16.8  10.2 
Standard deviation  3.0  5.7  7.5  3.5  6.7 
WAGES (for any reason) 
  more frequently 
Than once a year  yearly less frequently 
than once a year
never/don't 
know 
Total 12.1  59.5  25.6  2.9 
Euro area  11.4  59.5  26.4  2.7 
Austria 6.8  84.2  5.9  3.1 
Belgium 22.0  64.8  9.8  3.4 
France 19.7  74.1  5.2  1.1 
Greece
1 33.9  56.4  9.7  0.0 
Ireland 14.6  71.2  9.9  4.3 
Italy 4.2  26.9  64.6  4.3 
Netherlands 10.8  70.1  17.0  2.1 
Portugal 5.9  82.2  8.4  3.5 
Slovenia 27.2  65.6  5.9  1.3 
Spain 11.9  84.1  2.5  1.5 
Non- Euro Area  14.0  59.5  23.2  3.3 
Czech Republic  11.5  64.1  23.0  1.4 
Estonia 19.9  64.4  10.5  5.2 
Hungary 2.6  75.0  12.2  10.2 
Lithuania 42.1  44.0  7.5  6.4 
Poland 13.6  56.3  28.2  1.9 
Standard deviation  11.2 15.4  15.4  2.6 
Notes : Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. The split 
up between frequencies of wage changes has to be interpreted differently for Greece, as the 
options never/don't know were not allowed in the Greek questionnaire. 
 
 
Overall, the higher dispersion in the frequency of price adjustment across sectors than across 
countries suggests that product market characteristics (e.g. the degree of competition, the exposure 
to foreign competitive pressures, the cost structure, etc.) are important determinants of firms’   11  
pricing behaviour and potential sources of the degree of price stickiness. Conversely, the strong 
heterogeneity across countries that emerges with regard to wage change frequencies is a sign that 
the institutional setting, in particular the bargaining mechanisms, their coverage and their degree of 
centralisation, may be important forces behind the rigidity of wages. For instance in Italy, though 
expected inflation is embedded in wage negotiations, the latter are mostly centralised and carried 
out every two years; hence, firms consistently report very rare infra-annual wage adjustments. 
The evidence on the frequency of adjustment discussed so far can also be summarised through 
an alternative measure of nominal rigidity, i.e. the number of months for which prices and wages 
remain unchanged (“duration”). The computation of the duration indicator is still based on the 
answers concerning the frequency of price and wage changes but requires additional specific 
assumptions. In particular, whereas most of those answers directly translate into durations (e.g. 
“once a year” translates into a duration of 12 months), a few of them refer to intervals (e.g. “less 
frequently than once every two years”). In order to impute expected durations in these latter cases, 
we assume that the underlying distribution of durations is lognormal (with different moments for 
prices and wages), we estimate the parameters of the distributions from the other answers, and 
compute the conditional expectations for these categories.  
The results on duration should, therefore, be regarded as approximations, as the imputations 
are based on untestable distributional assumptions (see Appendix 3 for details). The impact of these 
assumptions on the estimates reported below is, however, quite negligible, as they concern only a 
minority of answers.8 Another important qualification is that price durations are not computed for 
around one-fourth of firms that report “no pattern” to the question on the frequency of price 
changes. A similar omission applies to wage changes, since wage durations are not computed for 
firms that report “never/don’t know” to the question on the frequency of wage changes; however, in 
this case it is much less relevant since it concerns only 3 percent of the firms. 
Table 5 shows that wages in European firms remain unchanged, on average, longer than 
prices (15 months against around 10). The estimate for prices is in line with the evidence emerged 
from the studies conducted within the IPN, which point to marginally longer durations: 11 months 
on the basis of survey data and around 13 months on the basis of micro-consumer price data. This 
slight difference might be related to both the fact that the sample of countries for which data are 
available is larger in the WDN survey and that the period in time to which data refer is different.  
Looking at sectoral differences, our results reveal that prices set by manufacturers and 
business services firms tend to remain unchanged on average for just less than one year, whereas 
those set in trade and financial services seem to be more flexible, with durations of 7 and 8 months, 
respectively. Conversely, average wage durations vary much less across sectors, with a low of 13 
months in construction to a high of 15 in trade. No remarkable differences emerge in price durations 
between euro area and non-euro area countries. In the case of wages, the relatively higher duration 
recorded for the euro area aggregate is entirely due to Italy, where wages remain unchanged for 
around 2 years, consistently with the wage bargaining institutional setup (see Du Caju et al. 2008), 







                                                 
8   The robustness of the results reported below has been assessed by computing duration measures under alternative 
assumptions concerning the number of months corresponding to the frequency intervals that do not directly translate 
into a point estimate. These robustness tests are not shown here but are available from the authors upon request.   12  
Table 5 – Estimated  average duration of price and wage spells 
(months) 
 Prices  Wages 
Total 9.6  14.9 
Manufacturing 10.2  14.9 
Construction 9.1  13.3 
Trade 6.7  15.3 
Market services  10.9  14.9 
Financial intermediation  7.7  14.4 
Euro area  9.6  15.0 
Austria 9.1  12.5 
Belgium 9.9  12.6 
Spain 9.7  11.9 
France 10.1  12.0 
Greece 10.2  11.9 
Ireland 8.5  12.8 
Italy 9.5  20.3 
Netherlands 9.1  13.9 
Portugal 9.5  12.9 
Slovenia 9.6  11.8 
Non-Euro area  9.6  14.7 
Czech Republic  9.7  14.6 
Estonia 10.0  12.7 
Hungary 10.7  13.8 
Lithuania 8.4  11.4 
Poland 9.5  15.4 
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, 
rescaled excluding non-responses.  
 
2.2  The timing of adjustment 
In addition to the frequency of price and wage adjustment, and partly related to it, another 
indicator that signals the presence and extent of nominal rigidities is the nature of the adjustment 
itself. In order to account for the fact that individual firms do not continuously change their prices 
and wages in response to all the relevant shocks that hit them, in the literature firms’ strategies are 
modelled either as a time-dependent process, where the timing of the adjustment is exogenously 
given and does not depend on the state of the economy, or as a state-dependent one. In presence of 
frequent shocks, the former might lead to stickier prices and wages than the latter, provided that the 
time frame is quite large and the cost of adjustment is low enough. Hence, which of the two 
approaches reflects better firms’ actual behaviour has important implications for monetary policy 
makers.9  
In particular, the degree of bunching of wage setting decisions may have an impact on the 
transmission of monetary policy decisions to the real economy. For instance, Olivei and Tenreyro 
(2008) show that in Japan, where most firms set their wages between February and May, in what is 
known as “Shunto”, a monetary policy shock occurring in the first part of the year should produce a 
smaller impact on real activity, since this is a period of more flexible wages, than a shock occurring 
later in the year. Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) derive similar results for the U.S. where wage changes 
concentrate at the turn of the year; they find that monetary policy shocks that take place in the 
second half of the year have insignificant effects on aggregate activity. 
With a view on obtaining more empirical evidence on these issues, in the WDN survey firms 
were asked to specify whether their wage and price changes take place with no predefined pattern or 
                                                 
9   According to IPN results, firms' price setting is characterized by elements of both time and state dependence: on 
average 34 percent of firms use purely time-dependent rules, whereas around two-thirds adopt a mixed strategy (as 
in Sheshinski and Weiss 1977). Most price adjustments occur at the beginning of the year (January) and after the 
summer period (especially in September).   13  
are concentrated in particular month(s) (see Appendix 2, questions 10 and 32). The results reported 
in Figure 2 show that time-dependent wage adjustment is significantly more widespread as a rule 
adopted by firms than time-dependent price adjustment. Indeed, the fraction of firms that typically 
change wages in specific months is 54 percent, whereas in the case of prices it amounts to 35 
percent. Among these firms, there appears to be a considerable degree of synchronisation in the 
timing of both price and wage change, with significant clustering in January. In the case of wage 
adjustment, smaller peaks also appear in July and April. 
 
Figure 2 - Timing of wage and price changes at the firm level 
(percentages of firms reporting to change wages/prices in a particular month) 
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
Figure 3 – Time-dependent price and wage adjustment across sectors 
(percentages of firms reporting to change wages/prices in a particular month) 
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
Looking at the sectoral dimension, the variability in the adoption of regular time-dependent 
rules in price revisions is quite remarkable, consistently with the high dispersion found in the 
frequency of the revisions themselves. The concentration in particular months is least common in 
financial services and more widespread in market services (Figure 3); in all sectors January is the 
month when the largest part of price changes occurs. Conversely, the pattern of concentration of 
wage changes is very similar across sectors, although slightly below average in construction and   14  
trade. Also in this case, wage adjustments occur mostly in January in all sectors, though July also 
has some significance in manufacturing and market services and more staggering across different 
months is detected in financial services. While in all sectors wage changes are generally more time-
dependent than price changes, the difference is particularly pronounced in financial intermediation, 
where only 12 percent of firms follow this type of rule for prices, as against 59 percent for wages. 
The finding that time-dependent adjustment mechanisms are more widespread for wages than 
for prices might be related to the existence of wage indexation mechanisms in some countries, as 
well as to the presence of institutional arrangements within the firm itself or at the national or 
sectoral level. Indeed, the cross-country differences in both the incidence of time-dependence and 
the timing of wage changes are quite remarkable. Lithuania is the country with the lowest fraction 
of wage changes concentrated in specific months (17 percent); at the other extreme Portugal has the 
highest fraction (94 percent). This indicator of relative wage rigidity is consistent with the 
respectively high and low frequency of wage adjustment found in the two countries (see Section 1). 
More generally, the percentage of firms that adopt time-dependent wage rules exceeds 70 percent in 
Spain, the Netherlands, France and Greece and is overall much higher for euro area countries (61 
percent) than for non-euro area ones (34 percent), possibly in relation to the more widespread 
diffusion of collective bargaining agreements and indexation clauses in the euro area. 
There appears to be a significant geographical variability also in the timing of wage 
adjustments. Although in all economies the majority of time-dependent wage changes occur in 
January, other specific months are indicated by relatively large shares of firms: July in Belgium, 
France and Lithuania; May in Austria; August in Slovenia, April in Ireland and September in 
Greece. These country-specificities in the time-patterns of wage change are confirmed both by 
micro wage data available at an infra-annual level and by the analysis of collective agreements 
carried out in the context of the WDN (see Du Caju et al., 2008), showing that the monthly pattern 
of wage changes is linked to the timing of wage negotiations.10 Some variation across countries can 
also be observed in the pervasiveness of time-dependent pricing, albeit less pronounced than in the 
case of wages (Figure 4). Overall, the fraction of euro area firms that carry out price adjustments 
with a regular timing is higher than in non-euro area countries as a whole (42 vs 17 percent, 
respectively). In all economies, most price changes occur in January.  
 
Figure 4 – Time-dependent price and wage adjustment across countries 
(percentages of firms reporting to change wages/prices in a particular month) 

















































Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
                                                 
10  The peak in the frequency of wage change in the beginning of each year emerges also from other studies conducted 
within the WDN on the basis of micro quantitative data for a number of individual countries (Knell and Stiglbauer 
2008 for Austria; Heckel et al. 2008 for France, Lünnemann and Wintr 2008 for Luxembourg).   15  
2.3  The interaction between wage and price adjustment 
Having assessed the degree of rigidity of wages and prices as captured by the frequency and 
the nature of the adjustment process, we focus explicitly on the interaction between wage and 
pricing policies at the firm level. In this context we address both the issue of whether firms’ wage 
and price adjustment are related (and the causal link between the two) and the extent to which they 
actually feed into each other. 
The WDN survey provides direct information on various aspects of this relationship, such as 
the link between price and wage changes at the firm level, the response of the former to wage 
shocks, the existence and nature of internal policies adjusting wages to inflation and the frequency 
of wage changes due to inflation. 
One of the findings stemming from the analysis in Section 2.2 is that there appears to be some 
broad synchronisation between the timing of price and wage changes, with peaks in January in both 
cases. Indeed, when looking at individual firms, it turns out that around half of those that change 
prices in January also adjust wages in the same month. This evidence is confirmed by the fact that, 
when explicitly asked about how the timing of price changes relates to that of wage changes within 
their company (see Appendix 2, question 33), around 40 percent of firms acknowledge the existence 
of some relationship between the two (Figure 5). However, only 15 percent state that this 
relationship is relatively strong. For half of them decisions on price changes follow those on wage 
changes. The opposite holds for another 3 percent, while decisions are simultaneous in the 
remaining 4 percent. The patterns with respect to intensity and direction of the relationship are very 
similar across sectors and across countries. 
 









no link link but no particular pattern decisions are taken
simultaneously
price changes follow wage
changes
wage changes follow price
changes
 
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
The finding that the majority of firms (60 percent) does not explicitly recognise a direct 
relationship between their “typical” price and wage change decisions does not automatically imply 
that the two policies are not related. Indeed, other pieces of evidence arising from the WDN survey 
suggest that wages and prices feed into each other at the micro level. 
The existence and extent of the pass-through of wages into prices can be gauged by analysing 
the strategies firms declare to implement in reaction to shocks. Indeed, when asked to assess the 
relevance of different adjustments policies to a common permanent unexpected increase in wages 
about 60 percent of firms reported that they would increase prices (see Table 6 and ECB, 2009).   16  
The possible options they could choose among where: i) a reduction in (other) costs; ii) an 
adjustment of prices; iii) a reduction of profit margins; iv) a reduction in output. 
In a study also based on the WDN survey, Bertola et al. (2008) argue that the pass-through of 
wages into prices is particularly strong in firms with a high labour share, confirming previous 
evidence from the IPN that prices are stickier in sectors typically characterised by a high incidence 
of labour costs. Conversely, the extent to which wages feed into prices is inversely related to the 
intensity of competitive pressures faced by the firms, their exposure to foreign markets and their 
size.11 Additional empirical evidence, based on alternative data and methods, of wage changes 
having a substantial impact on price dynamics at the firm level is rather limited. Studies carried out 
in the context of the WDN, focused on national micro data, find in general a significant but very 
low elasticity of prices to wages or labour costs (see Loupias and Sevestre, 2008; Rosolia and 
Venditti, 2008; Carlsson and Nordström Skans, 2008). 
 
Table 6 –Adjustment strategies to shocks 
(firms answering "relevant" or "very relevant", percentages) 
  Cost-push shock Wage shock Demand shock 
Reduce (other) costs  67.6  59.0  78.0 
Adjust prices  65.6  59.2  50.5 
Reduce margins  53.5  49.8  56.6 
Reduce output  21.4  22.5  49.9 
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-
responses. Greece is excluded from all the calculations and in addition 
Italy and Spain are excluded in the case of a demand shock.  
 
Turning to the evidence concerning the impact of prices on wages, an important element is the 
extent and speed to which wage changes in the firms are related to the general inflationary outlook. 
The existence and strength of this relationship is determined both by companies internal strategies 
adapting wages to inflation and by the characteristics of the national institutional settings, in 
particular the presence or not of indexation rules. The nature of these mechanisms – specific to the 
firm or set at the national level, formal or informal, forward or backward looking – is, hence, of 
extreme relevance from a policy perspective. Two questions on this issue were included in the 
survey (see Appendix 2, questions 6 and 7). Firms were first asked whether or not they have an 
internal policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation. If so, they had to report whether the 
adjustment (a) is automatic or not, (b) is subject to a formal rule, (c) refers to past or expected 
inflation (“backward” or “forward” looking). 
Figure 6 shows that on average only one-third of the firms have an internal policy adapting 
wages to inflation. Among them, nearly half adopt an automatic indexation mechanism, mostly of a 
backward looking nature, while the other half takes inflation into account without applying any 
formal rule. There is some variability across sectors: the existence of an internal indexation policy is 
less common in market services and more widespread in financial intermediation and construction. 
Table 7 summarises the information on formal and informal indexation mechanisms at the 
firm level across countries. It shows that the adjustment of wages to inflation is very common in 
Belgium and Spain (98 and 70 percent, respectively), where automatic indexation mechanisms are 
prevalent. Dutch and Italian firms, on the other hand, do not (or do it only marginally) adapt wages 
to inflation. In the remaining countries these internal mechanisms, mostly informal, are used to 
some extent. Expected inflation is more relevant for wage setting than past inflation only in 
Portugal.12 Overall, informal policies that link base wages to inflation are more widespread in non-
                                                 
11  All these results are confirmed by the multivariate regression analysis reported in Section 3. 
12  In the case of Germany, firms were not explicitly asked whether or not they have a policy that adapts changes in 
base wages to inflation. Nevertheless, when asked about the two main factors that determined the most recent wage 
increases, 27 percent of German firms replies that inflation was one of them.   17  
euro area countries than in euro area ones, while the opposite holds in the case of formal automatic 
adjustment mechanisms. 
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
The firm-level evidence reported so far complements information available from other 
sources on indexation at the country and sectoral level. The dataset on wage bargaining institutions 
collected within the WDN (see Du Caju et al., 2008) provides an overview of existence and 
coverage of formal wage indexation mechanisms across countries, developing a summary indicator 
of country-level indexation. According to this measure, reported in the last column of Table 7, 
workers are to some extent covered by formal wage indexation clauses in only seven of the 
countries examined here, coverage being particularly high in Belgium and Spain, low in Slovenia 
and very low in Austria, France, Italy and Poland.  
 
Table 7 - Adjustment of base wages to inflation: country overview (1) 
(percentages) 
    Firm-level policies (2) 
   Automatic link  
to inflation 
No formal rule,  
but inflation considered 





                    
 AT  8.6  1.3    9.2  2.8   22.0   Very  low 
 BE  98.2  0.0    0.0  0.0   98.2   High 
 CZ  5.8  2.6    26.4  22.1   56.9   None 
 EE  2.6  1.3    31.4  15.0   50.3   None 
 ES  38.3  16.2    10.9  5.0   70.4   High 
 FR  4.9  1.0    16.5  4.9   27.3   Very  low 
 GR  14.8  5.2    12.1  10.6   42.7   None 
 HU  7.2  4.2    14.0  5.9   33.0   None 
 IE  2.4  2.8    11.2  9.5   26.1   None 
 IT  1.2  0.5    2.6  1.5    5.8    Very  low 
 LT  7.3  3.7    24.3  12.9   48.1    
 NL  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0    0.0    None 
 PL  4.7  2.5    17.3  6.1   30.6   Very  low 
 PT  2.7  6.5    13.3  29.1   51.6   None 
 SI  20.3  2.7    32.2  5.1   60.3   Low 
                    
 Total  11.5  3.3    10.9  5.8   31.7    
 Euro  area  13.8  3.5    7.8  4.5   29.7    
  Non Euro area   5.3  2.8    19.3  9.5    37.2     
Notes: (1) Since some firms use a number of different methods of adjustment to inflation, 
the total may not be equal to the sum of the four methods. (2) Figures weighted by 
employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. (3) Percentage of workers 
covered by wage indexations clauses: Very low: 1-25%; Low: 26-50%; Moderate: 51-
75%; High: 76-100% (Source: Du Caju et al., 2008).  
   18  
Overall, information obtained from the WDN firm-level survey and the analysis of national 
wage bargaining systems suggest that, though formal or institutional indexation mechanisms are not 
a common feature across Europe, price developments are an important factor entering firms’ wage 
policies in many countries. Indeed, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland and 
Portugal, inflation is taken into account by a significant fraction of firms without relying on 
automatic or formal rules. 
A final piece of evidence provided by the WDN survey on how inflation developments affect 
firms’ wage decisions concerns the frequency of wage adjustments due to inflation. Figure 7 shows 
that inflation stands out as the prevalent factor triggering frequent wage adjustment (at an annual or 
infra-annual frequency). Sectoral heterogeneity is quite limited in contrast with the variability 
across countries which is, instead, remarkably large (Figure 8):13 while in Austria, Belgium and 
Spain over 80 percent of firms change wages annually or more frequently due to inflation, in Italy 
only 15 percent do that (60 percent report that they never adopt this policy).14 
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
                                                 
13  The Netherlands was not considered as Dutch firms do not adapt wages to inflation. 
14  Data for Greece here have a slightly different interpretation, as the option “never/don’t know”  was not allowed in 
the Greek questionnaire, the percentages are within the firms that actually change wages due to inflation.   19  
3  A firm level analysis of price and wage policies in a multivariate framework 
In this section we investigate, within a multivariate framework, the potential factors that may 
lie behind the frequency of price and wage changes at the firm level. We account for differences 
that could be country, sector or firm size specific and focus on the features that could potentially 
affect firms’ strategies. Some of them reflect the institutional setup, like the degree of wage 
indexation and the nature and coverage of collective bargaining, both at the firm and the country 
level. Other differences are related to the economic and technological environment, such as the 
degree of product market competition, the firms’ exposure in terms of external trade, labour 
intensity and the characteristics and composition of the labour force (share of white collars, of high 
skill workers, of permanent jobs, etc.). The factors considered in this analysis are described below. 
Intensity of product market competition. Whereas in the theoretical literature the relationship 
between market power and price stickiness is not clear-cut, there is an ample number of studies 
providing empirical evidence on the issue. Carlton (1986) and Hall et al. (2000) find that more 
competitive firms tend to adjust prices faster that firms facing less elastic demand. Geroski (1992) 
shows that price reaction to shocks is faster in more competitive industries. Álvarez and Hernando 
(2007) analyze the relationship between price flexibility and competition, focusing on euro area 
manufacturing and services industries. They conclude inter alia that price setting strategies of the 
most competitive firms give them greater room of manoeuvre to react to shocks.  
From an empirical viewpoint, measuring the degree of competition and in particular 
disentangling a situation of perfect competition and price taking agents from one of imperfect 
competition is not straightforward. This difficulty is even more pronounced in the context of survey 
data, where only qualitative information at the firm level is available, whereas the typical measures 
adopted in the literature rely on quantitative sectoral indicators or, at the micro level, on measures 
such as the number of competitors or the firm’s market share. The information provided by the 
WDN survey allows constructing a number of proxies for the intensity of competitive pressures 
faced by the firms. The first is the relevance of competitors’ pricing strategies; firms are asked 
(Appendix 2; question 30) to report the likelihood that a price reduction by competitors leads to a 
similar reaction by them. The second measure is based on the firms’ own assessment of the 
intensity of competition in their reference market (question 29).15 Since this indicator, which would 
be the preferred candidate to be used in our empirical analysis, is not available for 4 countries, we 
have to rely primarily on the first proxy. However, we will show below that our results are robust to 
the choice of the competition measure. 
Finally, as a large number of the firms included in the WDN survey operate on foreign 
markets, to capture the specific competitive pressures faced by them, we construct an indicator of 
the firm’s international exposure, proxied by the share of exports on total sales (question 27). 
Share of labour costs in total costs - Evidence arising from studies carried out in the context 
of the IPN, based  both on survey firm-level information and on quantitative producer prices micro 
data (see Fabiani et al., 2007, and Vermeulen et al., 2007) suggests a negative relationship between 
the incidence of labour on total costs and the frequency of price adjustment. The WDN survey 
allows addressing this potential relationship by directly asking firms the fraction of their total costs 
due to labour (question 40). 
Characteristics and flexibility of the workforce – Price and wage adjustment strategies at the 
firm level could be influenced by the relative easiness of adjustment of the labour force. This 
depends on both the composition of the workforce and the prevailing nature of the relationship 
                                                 
15  Based on the IPN results, questions on these more standard measures (number of competitors and the market share) 
were not included in the WDN survey, to reduce the burden on the firms. Indeed, in the survey studies conducted 
within the IPN the indicator based on firms’ reaction to competitors’ pricing strategies, proved to be highly 
correlated with the standard measures (see Fabiani et al., 2007).   20  
between the firm and its employees. The WDN survey provides information on these aspects 
through a number of indicators: i) the incidence of permanent full-time employees on the total 
workforce (question 34); ii) the share of high-skilled and of white-collar employees (question 1); iii) 
for some countries, the tenure structure of the firms’ labour force (question 38). 
Other adjustment means – Information available from the survey allows considering also 
margins of adjustment at the disposal of firms other than changing base wages and prices, which 
could affect price and wage change mechanisms. The indicators capturing these aspects in our 
regressions are the turnover of the workforce and the flexible component of the wage, namely the 
share of bonuses on the firm’s total wage bill. 
Labour market institutions – The theoretical literature assigns an important role to wage 
bargaining institutions for wage stickiness and in particular to the degree of centralisation of wage 
settlements. Although the availability of comparable empirical data at an international level is quite 
limited due to the non-standardised nature of measures, the incomplete coverage of countries, 
periods and institutional features, empirical results based on micro data suggest that agreements 
bargained at the firm level tend to lead to higher wage flexibility by leaving firms greater margins 
for manoeuvre for reacting to economic fluctuations. The WDN survey allows to overcome the data 
limitations described above and to test this relationship on the basis of the information reported by 
firms on the characteristics of wage negotiations, both firm-specific and institutionally driven. Our 
empirical analysis relies on a set of covariates that include: i) the degree of centralisation of 
collective pay agreements, in particular, whether wages are mostly negotiated outside the firm, 
either at the national or sectoral level (question 2); ii) the existence of firm-level collective 
agreements (question 3); iii) the percentage of the firm’s employees covered by collective 
agreements, irrespective of their nature (question 4); iv) the existence within the firm of internal 
policies (automatic or not) aimed at adapting salaries to past or expected inflation (questions 6 and 
7). In the wage frequency equation, we also include an indicator of the stringency of employment 
protection legislation, based on OECD data extended to eastern European countries following Tonin 
(2005). 
Finally, we control for other firm’s characteristics through a set of variables that capture the 
economic sector of activity (manufacturing, construction, trade, business services, financial 
services), the size in terms of number of employees (5-19, 20-49, 50-199, >199), the country the 
firm belongs to. These dummies also help to account for unobserved characteristics of the firm that 
might impact on the frequency of price and base wage changes but are not captured by the other 
explanatory variables. 
3.1  Ordered probit estimation 
To better understand whether and to what extent the features described above are related to 
the rigidity of prices and base wages, both expressed in terms of frequency of adjustments, we 
estimate an ordered probit. In the case of prices, the dependent variable is a categorical one 
increasing with the degree of stickiness, it takes values from 1 to 4, where 1= the firm change prices 
at a daily to monthly frequency; 2= the firm changes the price of the main product quarterly-half-
yearly or twice a year; 3=the price of the main product is changed once a year; 4=changed less 
frequently than once a year. Also in the case of wages, the value categories of the dependent 
variable are increasing in the degree of stickiness, from 1 to 3, where 1=the firm changes wages 
more frequently than yearly; 2= changes wages yearly; 3=changes wages less frequently than 
yearly.16  
                                                 
16  In the case of prices, we drop category 5 (“no pattern”), as we do not have information on the effective frequency of 
price changes, and estimate the model only on the firms that have explicitly indicated that they have a pattern when 
changing prices, excluding about 25 percent of the initial sample. In the case of wages we also drop the last category 
(“never/don’t know”) which hardly amounts to 3 percent of the sample. In the regressions displayed in the text we   21  
Table 8 contains the probit estimates for frequency of price changes and Table 9 those for the 
frequency of wage changes. 17 In both tables, several specifications exploring the role of the features 
described above are shown. Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in Appendix 4 display the marginal effect of 
each variable when estimating the preferred specification (reported in column 5 of Table 8 for 
prices, and column 7 of Table 9 for wages). 
The results confirm that cross-sectoral differences matter both for the flexibility of prices and 
of wages. Our baseline specification (column 1 in both tables) shows that for firms operating in 
construction, trade and financial intermediation prices tend to be adjusted more frequently than in 
manufacturing (which is the reference category in the regression), while they are stickier in market 
services. In all services sectors, including trade, wages turn out to be significantly stickier than in 
manufacturing, whereas they are adjusted more frequently in construction. 
We do not find strong evidence of relevant country-specific patterns for price change 
frequency.18 This turns out not to be the case for wage adjustment, as many of the country effects 
have a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that wages adjust somewhat less frequently than 
in the reference country, that is Estonia, whose labour market is one of the most flexible of the EU. 
Only for Greece, Lithuania and Slovenia the coefficient is negatively signed and significant. 
Firms’ size influences the pattern of both price and wage adjustment, which in both cases is 
likely to happen more frequently in larger firms than in small ones (the omitted category in the 
regression is that of small firms with 5 to 19 employees). 
As already mentioned, our survey allows to explicitly assess to what extent the flexibility of 
the firm’s cost structure, proxied by the share of labour on total costs, affects the duration of prices 
and wages. The estimates reported in column 2 in Table 8 show that the higher the fraction of firms’ 
costs accounted by labour, the lower the frequency of price changes. Interestingly, once we control 
for this variable the result that prices are stickier in market services vanishes, reflecting the fact that 
this sector is in general the one with the highest share of labour costs.19 The flexibility of the cost 
structure does not appear instead as being significantly correlated with wage behaviour (column 2, 
Table 9). 
Turning to the role played by the economic environment and market forces, our estimates 
(columns 3) highlight that the degree of product market competition, proxied by the likelihood that 
a price reduction by competitors leads to a similar reaction in the firm, is negatively related to price 
stickiness. This result, which is robust to the use of the alternative measures of competitive 
pressures described above (as shown in Table 10), confirms earlier IPN findings that also pointed to 
a systematic positive relationship between the frequency of price revisions and changes and the 
intensity of competition pressures. These factors, instead, are not significant for wage adjustment. 
Prices are adjusted more frequently also in firms that are more exposed to foreign competition, as 
captured by the share of turnover generated on foreign markets. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
consider the frequency of wage adjustment due to any reasons. However, a similar analysis conducted separately on 
the frequency of wage changes due to (i) reasons different from inflation and tenure (ii) inflation (iii) tenure, gives 
broadly similar results. 
17  The ordered probit model may have some drawbacks. If, for example, all firms in a given country fall into the 
middle wage frequency category, the inclusion of the country dummy would affect the probability of firms falling in 
the other two categories, not enabling to draw sound conclusions on the lower or higher flexibility of wages. This 
however does not turn out to be a problem in our sample. First, in no case such an event occurs. Second, regressions 
based on a multinomial probit model provide similar results to those reported in Tables 8 and 9 (reesults are 
available upon request).  
18  Although country dummies are jointly significant in the price frequency regression, their exclusion, which is not 
shown in the table, does not change the size and significance of the other coefficients and the overall fit of the 
equation declines only slightly. 
19  We also tried to allow for a non-linear relationship by, first, introducing the variable squared, which turned out to be 
not significant and, second, constructing categorical dummies for different ranges of the labour cost share [20, 40, 
80, 100] but the results did not support non-linearity.   22  
The composition of the labour force and job-specific characteristics (columns 4 in Tables 8 
and 9) only matter for the degree of price stickiness, the frequency of adjustment being negatively 
associated to the share of highly skilled personnel and of white-collars.  
 
Table 8 – Price rigidity 
(ordered probit estimates, unweighted) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Construction  -0.331** -0.354** -0.355** -0.349** -0.313** -0.369** -0.369** 
Trade  -0.689** -0.699** -0.745** -0.778** -0.753** -0.77**  -0.77** 
Market services   0.088**   0.033  -0.022  -0.041  -0.006  -0.035  -0.036 
Financial  intermediation  -0.566** -0.644** -0.621** -0.825** -0.746** -0.672** -0.67** 
20-49  -0.022 -0.031 -0.028 -0.008 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
50-199  -0.15**  -0.149** -0.148** -0.126** -0.131** -0.124** -0.125** 
>200  -0.241** -0.226** -0.207** -0.162** -0.176** -0.168** -0.164** 
AT   0.111   0.117   0.115   0.065   0.059   0.071   0.059 
BE  -0.026   0.025 -0.209 -0.122 -0.205 -0.217 -0.203 
CZ  -0.002  -0.018  -0.007   0.066   0.068   0.061   0.063 
ES   0.012   0.007  -0.036  -0.018   0.001  -0.007  -0.002 
FR  -0.05  -0.072 -0.106 -0.129 -0.151 -0.111 -0.117 
GR   0.113   0.085   0.118   0.018       
HU   0.214**   0.179*   0.154   0.162   0.135   0.129   0.12 
IE  -0.1  -0.134 -0.158 -0.158 -0.19  -0.203 -0.212 
IT  -0.005   0.01  -0.014 -0.01  -0.026 -0.015 -0.032 
LT  -0.438** -0.496** -0.533** -0.506** -0.6  -0.613** -0.614** 
NL  -0.112*  -0.172*  -0.126 -0.122 -0.153 -0.161 -0.179 
PL  -0.06  -0.051 -0.036 -0.044 -0.091 -0.104 -0.114 
PT  -0.075 -0.068 -0.065 -0.072 -0.095 -0.092 -0.093 
SI   0.031   0.037   0.086   0.114   0.076     
labour cost share     0.42**   0.425**   0.448**   0.426**   0.508**   0.504** 
competitive  pressures      -0.327** -0.32**  -0.314** -0.301** -0.3** 
export (% of sales)      -0.109*  -0.131**  -0.106*  -0.139*  -0.141* 
share of white collars         0.153**   0.168**   0.167**   0.169** 
share of high skilled workers         0.076*   0.075*   0.087*   0.088* 
share of full time permanent workers         0.106   0.025  -0.009  -0.008 
workforce turnover           -0.162**  -0.15**  -0.151** 
share of bonuses on total wage bill           0.02   0.01   0.01 
collective agreement outside the firm            -0.067  -0.066 
collective agreement at the firm level            -0.03  -0.029 
coverage of collective agreement             0.055   0.054 
internal policy adjusting wages to prices              -0.033 
Observations  10191  9294 8483 6879 6031 5340 5333 
Pseudo R
2  0.037 0.039 0.051 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.053 
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases 
with the degree of rigidity, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=prices changed at a daily to monthly frequency and 
4=prices changed less frequently than once a year. 
 
Firms experiencing high labour force turnover seems to adjust more often both prices and 
wages (columns 5). In addition, firms that use other means of wage adjustments than base wages, as 
for example bonuses, also seem to adjust base wages more often.20 
The introduction of the set of covariates capturing the institutional environment underlying 
wage policies and the functioning of the labour market (columns 6 and 7 in Table 8) does not 
improve the equation explaining price stickiness, as all these variables turn out as being not 
significant. Conversely, collective bargaining at the firm level improves the relative flexibility of 
wages (columns 6 and 7 in Table 9), whereas the stringency of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and the coverage of collective agreements act in the opposite direction (columns 6 and 7). 
Finally, the existence of internal policies that adapt base wages to (past or expected) inflation turns 
                                                 
20  The difference between the wage paid by firms and the base wage, the so-called “wage cushion” (Cardoso and 
Portugal, 2005), could be a strategic buffer against adverse shocks; above all in a context where the downward 
nominal wage rigidity becomes an active restriction.   23  
out to be positively correlated with the frequency of wage change, confirming that inflation stands 
as an important driving force of infra-annual or annual wage adjustment (as shown in Figure 8). The 
results described above for the other covariates hold also when this variable is included, despite its 
potential endogeneity (see column 7 in Table 9). 
 
Table 9 – Wage rigidity 
(ordered probit estimates, unweighted) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Construction  -0.331** -0.314** -0.113*  -0.118*  -0.133** -0.198** -0.213** 
Trade   0.067*   0.08**   0.088**   0.059   0.125**   0.108**   0.108** 
Market services   0.122**   0.136**   0.138**   0.13**   0.145**   0.12**   0.12** 
Financial intermediation   0.093   0.121   0.269**   0.232**   0.285**   0.21*   0.24** 
20-49  -0.054  -0.063* -0.102**  -0.105**  -0.083* -0.094* -0.1* 
50-199  -0.174** -0.176** -0.217** -0.243** -0.183** -0.207** -0.208** 
>200  -0.319** -0.311** -0.347** -0.348** -0.309** -0.331** -0.313** 
AT   0.208*   0.205*   0.195*   0.158   0.221*   0.282*   0.161 
BE  -0.136  -0.125   0.156   0.075   0.351   0.15   0.305 
CZ   0.648**   0.656**   0.69**   0.624**   0.725**   0.854**   0.852** 
ES  -0.032 -0.037 -0.017 -0.019 -0.08  -0.372*  -0.308* 
FR  -0.09  -0.095 -0.065 -0.11  -0.115 -0.271**  -0.365** 
GR  -0.357** -0.349** -0.316** -0.379**      
HU   0.517**   0.471**   0.493**   0.473**   0.467**   0.715**   0.626** 
IE   0.161   0.169   0.174   0.13   0.134   0.537**   0.443** 
IT   1.681**   1.696**   1.754**   1.753**   1.678**   1.651**   1.459** 
LT  -0.455** -0.455** -0.469** -0.406** -0.511** -0.681** -0.692** 
NL   0.456**   0.423**   0.419**   0.356**   0.338**   0.352**   0.138 
PL   0.534**   0.531**   0.527**   0.487**   0.505*   0.565**   0.474** 
PT   0.37**   0.361**   0.378**   0.379**   0.414**       
SI  -0.259** -0.265** -0.27**  -0.299** -0.269**    
labour cost share    -0.035  -0.019   0.003   0.031   0.054   0.026 
competitive pressures      -0.026  -0.023  -0.003   0.01   0.012 
export (% of sales)      -0.016   0  -0.017  -0.013  -0.023 
share of white collars          0.057       
share of high skilled workers          0.012       
share of full time permanent workers          0.03       
workforce turnover           -0.157**  -0.144**  -0.17** 
share of bonuses on total wage bill          -0.167**  -0.172**  -0.16** 
collective agreement outside the firm            -0.055  -0.047 
collective agreement at the firm level            -0.112*  -0.088* 
coverage of collective agreement             0.089*   0.092* 
EPL         0.104**    0.133** 
internal policy adjusting wages to 
prices        - 0 . 3 9 3 * *  
Observations  14121 12741 11605 9396  10070 8993  8974 
Pseudo R
2  0.095 0.094 0.097 0.093 0.100 0.101 0.117 
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases 
with the degree of rigidity, ranging from 1 to 3, where 1=wages changed more frequently that once a year and 
4=wages changed less frequently than once a year. 
 
Table 10 - Price rigidity and alternative measures of competitive pressures 
 (ordered probit estimates, unweighted)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Perceived competition is severe or strong   -0.324**       
Very likely or likely to follow price reduction by competitors    -0.327**     
Perceived competition is severe        -0.489** 
Perceived competition  is strong        -0.305** 
Perceived competition is weak        -0.070 
Very likely  to follow price reduction by competitors      -0.489**   
Likely  to follow price reduction by competitors      -0.301**   
Not likely  to follow price reduction by competitors      -0.057   
Observations 7065  9555  9555  7065 
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Other covariates, not 
shown in the table, include country, sector and firm size dummies. The dependent variable increases with the 
degree of rigidity, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=prices changed at a daily to monthly frequency and 4=prices 
changed less frequently than once a year.   24  
Various pieces of evidence provided by the regressions, such as the relevance of the labour 
cost share in explaining the rigidity of price adjustment and the positive relationship between firm 
level policies adjusting wages to inflation point to a positive relationship between the duration of 
prices and that of wages at the firm level.21 This relationship is however likely to be affected by 
simultaneity and interdependences, which are formally addressed in the next section. 
3.2  Disentangling the simultaneous relationship of price and wage rigidity  
The connection between price and wage rigidities has long been investigated in the economic 
literature (see Taylor, 1999 and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, also for a review of the literature). 
The empirical studies have mainly focused on the behaviour of real wages over the business cycle, 
reaching little consensus on the cyclical pattern of the markup of price over costs. The richness of 
firm-level information contained in our survey, which however does not have a time dimension, 
allows to address this issue from a different perspective, namely focusing on the mechanism 
through which wage and price rigidities feed into each other. 
The empirical analysis described in the previous section suggests that, indeed, there is an 
interaction between price and wage stickiness at the firm level. This result corroborates the 
evidence that a substantial share of firms acknowledge a relationship between the timing of their 
wage and price adjustment decisions, with half of those changing prices in January also adjusting 
wages in the same month. 
Here we acknowledge the possible simultaneity of these two variables and allow for the 
relationship to run in both directions by estimating a system of equations of price and wage change 
frequencies: 
 
i pi wi i wi i w
i wi pi i pi i p
v freq z x freq
u freq z x freq
+ + + =






where freqpi and freqwi are, respectively, the frequency of price and wage changes in firm i, as in 
case of the probits in the previous section these are categorical variables  increasing with the degree 
of stickiness, vector xi contains covariates common to both equations (it also includes variables on 
sector and size; see below about the omission of country dummies), vector zpi those variables that 
are assumed to affect the frequency of prices but not that of wages and, conversely, vector zwi those 
affecting the frequency of wages but not that of prices; ui and vi represent unobserved heterogeneity 
in price and wage change frequencies, respectively, and are allowed to be correlated. 
The parameters of main interest are κ and λ: the former captures the effect of the duration of 
wages on prices, the latter that running from prices to wages. Both are identified by the exclusion 
restrictions, i.e. the presence of the zpi and zwi variables (instruments), whose choice is, therefore, of 
crucial importance. 
The key principle in selecting the instruments relies on the notion that wage setting is affected 
by institutional factors that have no direct effect on prices, whereas price setting is influenced by 
product market characteristics that have no direct effect on wages, as emerged from the probit 
analysis carried out above. On this basis, the instruments in the price equation (zpi) are our measure 
of the degree of product market competition, the exposure to foreign markets, the share of labour 
costs on total costs, and some characteristics of the labour force at the firm level. Instruments in the 
wage equation (zwi) include, instead, the turnover of the firms’ workforce, the share of bonuses on 
the total wage bill, the presence of collective wage agreements at the firm level, their coverage and 
the degree of employment protection. In principle, if the instruments in the wage equation are to 
reflect institutional differences, they should come to a large extent from cross-country variation. 
                                                 
21  This is confirmed by the strong and significant correlation found when the frequency of price change is introduced 
as a covariate in the equation of wage changes and vice versa (results are not shown in Tables 8 and 9).   25  
Controlling for country dummies in xi might therefore take out the most important source of 
variation in the instruments. This consideration has led us to run two different experiments. In the 
first, we remove all country dummies; in the second, we assume that the cross-country variation in 
wage setting strategies is due to institutional factors which do not affect prices, and therefore 
include country dummies in vector zwi. Results from both specifications are presented in Table 11. 
It is important to remark that the evidence provided by the system estimates of κ and λ does 
not necessarily have to be consistent with the direct evidence from firms’ answers on the existence 
of a link between the timing of price and wage change decisions. In fact, the system estimates the 
relationship of price and wage change frequency by looking at whether those firms that, for some 
exogenous reason, change prices (wages) more frequently are also induced to change wages (prices) 
more frequently. Instead, the survey question is about the link of price and wage setting in general, 
with the answers spelling out the timing patterns. Though related, the two concepts are not the 
same. Furthermore, in the system the effects are identified by assumption from the exogenous 
variation in the frequency variables induced by their instruments. 
Because of these differences it is possible to have firms that change wages more frequently 
when for some exogenous reason prices are also changed more frequently and at the same time to 
find no link or specific pattern in price and wage setting in general. Nevertheless, it is hard to 
imagine that in firms that report having a link running in one direction, the duration in price (wage) 
is not induced by that in wage (price). We can thus interpret the system estimates as looking at a 
specific kind of relationship between wage and price setting at the firm level as opposed to the more 
general link investigated before. 
The system is estimated by three-stage least squares. Table 11 presents the results of the most 
important parameters.22 The estimates establish a statistically significant relationship from the 
frequency of wage changes to that of prices; the effect in the opposite direction is not significant. 
The instruments are strong and show effects that are intuitive in most cases and are similar to the 
previous probit estimates (where the price and wage frequency equations can be viewed as reduced-
form versions of the system estimated here). Prices are adjusted significantly more often in firms 
that (a) face stronger product market competition, (b) are more export-oriented, (c) have a more 
flexible structure of the workforce, and (d) present a lower incidence of labour costs. 
 
Table 11 – System estimates on price and wage rigidity 
(3-stage least squares, unweighted) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
freq. of  
wage 
change 
freq. of  
price 
change 
freq. of  
wage 
change 
freq. of  
price 
change 
freq. of  
wage 
change 
freq. of  
price 
change 
frequency of price change    0.069    0.065     0.07   
frequency of wage change     0.507**     0.135*     0.124* 
labour cost share     0.26**     0.284**     0.281** 
competitive pressures    -0.207**   -0.215**   -0.215** 
export (% of sales)    -0.092*   -0.089*   -0.091* 
share of white collars     0.106**     0.106**     0.108** 
share of high skilled workers     0.074**     0.066**     0.066 
share of bonuses on total wage bill  -0.005    -0.052**    -0.046**   
workforce turnover  -0.08**    -0.073**    -0.079**   
collective agreement at the firm level  -0.051**   -0.031    -0.022   
coverage of collective agreement   0.085**     0.028     0.027   
EPL -0.126**     0.763**     0.792**  
internal policy adjusting wages to prices          -0.15**  
country dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
sector and firm size   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 5217  5217  5217  5217  5211  5211 
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variables 
increase with the degree of rigidity (see notes to Tables 8 and 9). 
                                                 
22  The full set of results is available from the authors upon request.   26  
4  Conclusions 
This paper provides new evidence on firms’ price and wage adjustment across European 
firms, with a particular emphasis on the presence and degree of nominal rigidities. It focuses on 
three specific aspects related to this issue: the frequency of wage and price changes; the prevailing 
mechanism of adjustment and its timing; the extent to which wage and price changes feed into each 
other. The main conclusions are the following. 
Firms adjust wages less frequently than prices. The former tend to remain unchanged for 
about 15 months on average, while the latter for around 10 months (in line with previous estimates 
from the IPN). 
The cross-sectoral variation in the frequency of price adjustment is large compared to that of 
wage adjustment. Instead, country differences are larger for wage change frequencies than for price 
change frequencies. This evidence possibly reflects the fact that the economic context in which 
individual firms operate, which is likely to differ substantially across sectors, is crucial for pricing 
strategies, whereas the institutional setting, which is strongly country-specific, matters mostly in 
shaping wage adjustments strategies.  
Indeed, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of price and wage rigidity at the firm level 
confirms that more frequent price adjustments are associated with higher intensity of competitive 
pressures and exposure to foreign markets, as well as with a lower share of labour costs on total 
costs (consistently, prices are found to be stickier in business services). Conversely, wages tend to 
be more flexible in the presence of firm-level collective wage agreements whereas the stringency of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) and the coverage of collective agreements act in the 
opposite direction. There is also a correlation between frequency of wage changes and the presence 
of (formal or informal) indexation mechanisms of wages to inflation. 
The extent of wage and price rigidities is also related to the adjustment mechanisms adopted 
by firms, time-dependent strategies delivering, in general, higher rigidity. On average, 54 percent of 
firms report that wage changes are concentrated in a particular month, mostly January. On the 
contrary, only one-third of firms adopt time-dependent pricing rules. For both prices and wages the 
concentration of adjustments in specific months is significantly higher in euro area countries than in 
new EU member states. In the case of wages, this might reflect the more widespread adoption of 
indexation clauses in the euro area as well as the higher importance of collective wage agreements, 
which enhance coordinated wage adjustments. 
Various pieces of evidence confirm that wages and prices feed into each other at the micro 
level and that there is a relationship between wage and price rigidity. First, around half of the firms 
that change prices in January also change wages in that month. Second, 40 percent of the firms 
acknowledge a relationship (formal or informal) between the timing of their wage and price 
adjustment decisions. Third, when asked to assess the relevance of different adjustments policies to 
a common permanent unexpected increase in wages, about 60 percent of firms report that they 
would increase prices. Fourth, firm-level wage changes appear to be related to the general 
inflationary outlook, whether due to the existence of internal policies adapting wages to inflation or 
to the national institutional setting. Fifth, firms with a high labour cost share report a tighter link 
between price and wage changes and a lower frequency of price adjustment. Finally, even 
accounting for the likely simultaneity between price and wage changes, a statistically significant 
relationship is found, running from the frequency of wage changes to that of prices. 
The results can help to improve the calibration of New Keynesian macro models with price 
and wage stickiness. In particular, the implication of our empirical evidence regarding for instance 
average wage and price duration, synchronization between wage and price adjustment, the presence 
of a “January effect”, have started to be investigated more closely in the context of the WDN (see 
De Walque et al., 2009). It must be kept in mind, however, that the surveys were carried out in a 
period characterized by a relatively stable economic environment. Firms’ price and wage setting in 
the context of exceptionally unstable economic and financial conditions is ongoing research.    27  
Appendix 1 – The survey 
The WDN-survey project involved all euro area countries except Finland and Malta23, as well 
as Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland (in total, 17 countries). The group 
opted for a decentralised approach in which each National Central Bank was responsible for 
carrying out the survey within its country. However, strong coordination guaranteed that the 
national questionnaires, at least with respect to a subset of clearly pre-defined “core questions”, 
were almost fully harmonized. 
This paper is based on results for all countries except Luxembourg and Germany: for the 
former results were not available yet at the time of completing the paper, while for the latter country 
results turned out not to be comparable due to major differences in the questionnaire actually sent to 
German firms. 
The national surveys were carried out between the second half of 2007 and the first half of 
2008. Their main characteristics are summarised in Table  A1.1. In most cases the survey was 
outsourced to an external company, which collected the answers from firms mainly by traditional 
mail or the internet. Operational instructions were added to the questionnaire, in particular 
regarding (i) the person who preferably was required to fill in the questionnaire (the CEO or the 
Human Resource Manager), (ii) the business unit answers should refer to (the firm and not the 
establishment), and (iii) the reference period (period covered by the latest 12-month profit and loss 
account, or, for a few questions, the end of the reference period). All NCB's pre-tested the 
questionnaire on a pilot sample. 
The branches of activity underlying the samples vary across countries; for the purpose of the 
common empirical analysis, firms have been grouped in 6 sectors: manufacturing, trade, market 
services, construction, energy and financial intermediation; as shown in Table A1.1, all national 
samples cover the first three sectors (except Germany, where trade is not covered); in many surveys 
construction, energy and financial intermediation were also considered, whereas non-market 
services were included in five country samples only. Because of the poor coverage in terms of 
number of interviewed firms, the energy sector and non-market services were excluded from the 
cross-country analysis. 
Concerning firm size, the sample was split up into four classes: 5 to 19 employees, 20 to 49 
employees, 50 to 199 employees and 200 employees and more. Since very small firms (with less 
than 5 employees) were covered in Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain and Poland 
only, they were excluded from the harmonised analysis of the results. 
The sample size was quite different across countries, ranging from 1,400 in Estonia to 6,500 
in France. In terms of response rate, three broad groups can be identified: Austria, Greece and 
Lithuania with a response rate below 20 percent; a large group of countries with response rates 
between 20 and 50 percent; and Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain with above 
50 percent. Overall, more than 17,000 firms were surveyed. In this paper, results for almost 15,000 
firms are analyzed. 
                                                 
23  The survey was conducted in Cyprus at a later stage.    28  
Table A1.1 – The main characteristics of the national surveys 
Country  Sectoral  
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Appendix 2 - The WDN survey questionnaire 
Wage setting and wage changes 
This section focuses on information on wage setting practices, on the frequency and timing of wage changes. It also collects information on how the wages 
of new workers are set relative to those of existing workers. Unless otherwise indicated, answers should refer to “normal conditions and practices”. 
1 – How were your firm’s employees distributed across the following occupational groups at the end of the reference period ? 
For the definition of employees and of occupational groups, see the Appendix. 
Low skilled blue collar/Production   ____% 
High skilled blue collar/Technical  ____% 
Low skilled white collar/Clerical  ____% 
High skilled white collar/Professional  ____% 
Other  ____% 
TOTAL ( = 100%)  100  % 
2 – Does your firm apply a collective pay agreement bargained and signed outside the firm (at the national, regional, sectoral or occupational level) ? 
No, such an agreement does not exist  □ 
No, we opt out  □ 
Yes, we apply such an agreement  □ 
3 – Notwithstanding your answer to question 2, does your firm apply a collective pay agreement signed at the firm level ? 
Yes  □ 
No  □ 
4 – If “yes” in questions 2 or 3, what percentage of your firm’s employees are covered by a collective pay agreement (at any level) ? 
_______ % 
5 – What percentage of your total wage bill in the “reference period” was related to individual or company performance related bonuses or benefits? 
Definition of bonuses / benefits (flexible wage components) - part of compensation different from the base wage and usually linked to individual’s performance.  
_____ % 
6 – Does your firm have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation ? 
Definition of base wage - direct remuneration excluding bonuses (regular wage and salary, commissions, piecework payments).  
No   □  → GO TO QUESTION 8 
Yes  □ 
7 – If “yes” in question 6, please select the options that best reflects the policy followed: 
Wage changes are automatically linked to:   
                             - past inflation   □ 
                             - expected inflation   □ 
Although there is no formal rule, wage changes take into account:   
                             - past inflation  □ 
                             - expected inflation   □ 
8 – NON-CORE What is the principle of remuneration for the main occupational group (as defined in question 1)? 
Please choose a single option 
Definition of hourly, piece-rate and monthly base wage - base wage per hour worked, per month worked, or per pieces produced. 
Hourly base wage  □  
Piece-rate base wage  □ 
Monthly base wage {or other period-specific wage}  □ 
Other {please specify} ______________________________________  □  
9 –  How frequently is the base wage of an employee belonging to the main occupational group in your firm (as defined in question 1) typically changed in 
your firm?  
Please tick an option for each of the three types of wage changes listed below. 
 
more than once 
a year  once a year  once every two 
years 
less frequently 




Wage changes apart from tenure and/or inflation  □  □  □  □  □ 
Wage changes due to tenure  □  □  □  □  □ 
Wage changes due to inflation  □  □  □  □  □ 
10 – Under normal circumstances, are base wage changes concentrated in any particular month / months? 
No        □ 
Yes:     Jan. □      Feb. □     Mar. □     Apr. □     May □     June □     July □     Aug. □     Sept. □     Oct. □     Nov. □     Dec. □ 
11 – Considering the main occupational group in your firm (as identified in question 1), please indicate among the following options which is the most 
relevant factor in determining the entry wage of newly hired employees: 
Please choose a single option 
Collective pay agreement (signed at any level)  □ 
Wage of similar employees in the firm  □ 
Wage of similar workers outside the firm  □ 
Availability of workers with similar characteristics in the labour market  □ 
Other reasons (please specify) _______________________________  □ 
12 – NON-CORE If there is abundance in the labour market of workers you need to hire, do you pay newly hired employees significantly lower wage than that 
of similar (in terms of experience and qualitfication) employees already in the firm? 
Yes  □ 
No, because (please choose a single option, the most important reason):  
a) It would be perceived as unfair and earn the firm bad reputation  □ 
b) it would have a negative effect on the work effort of the new employees  □ 
c) It is not allowed by labour regulation or collective pay agreement  □ 
d) Unions would contest such action  □ 
e) Other reasons (please specify)__________________________________________  □   30  
13 –  NON-CORE If there is a shortage in the labour market of workers you need to hire and attracting new workers is difficult, do you give newly hired 
employees significantly higher wage than that of similarly qualified employees already in the firm? 
Yes  □ 
No, because (please choose a single option, the most important reason):   
a) It would be perceived as unfair by existing employees  □ 
b) It would have a negative effect on work effort of the employees in the firm  □ 
c) It is not allowed by labour regulation or collective pay agreement  □ 
d) It would generate pressure for wage increases by existing employees  □ 
e) Other reasons (please specify)__________________________________________  □ 
Downward wage rigidity and the adjustment to shocks 
This section addresses the issue of the presence of (potential) obstacles to downward wage adjustments and the reaction of firms to different shocks. 
14 – Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been frozen ?  
Definition of freeze in base wage - base wage in nominal terms remains unchanged from a pay negotiation to the next.   
    - No   □ 
    - Yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees)  _____% 
15 – Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been cut  ? 
Definition of cut in base wage - base wage in nominal terms decreases from a pay negotiation to the next. 
    - No  □ 
    - Yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees)  _____% 
16 – NON-CORE  If “yes” in either question 14 or 15, what was the main reason for freezing/reducing the base wage?  
Please choose a single option, the most important reason. 
Profitability and/or sales went down  □ 
Other costs increased   □ 
Jobs were at risk  □ 
It was imposed by legislation or a higher level collective agreement   □ 
Because worker performance was not satisfactory  □ 
Other reasons (please specify)__________________________________  □ 
17 – How relevant is each one of the following reasons in preventing base wage cuts? 
Please tick an option for each line. 
  not  
relevant 
of little 




Labour regulation/collective agreements prevent wages from being cut  □  □  □  □  □ 
It would reduce employees’ efforts, resulting in less output or poorer service  □  □  □  □  □ 
It would have a negative impact on employees' morale  □  □  □  □  □ 
It would damage the firm’s reputation as an employer, making it more difficult to 
hire workers in the future  □  □  □  □  □ 
In presence of a wage cut the most productive employees might leave the firm  □  □  □  □  □ 
A wage cut would increase the number of employees who quit, increasing the 
cost of hiring and training new workers   □  □  □  □  □ 
It would create difficulties in attracting new workers  □  □  □  □  □ 
Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in income. Therefore workers and firms 
reach an implicit understanding  that wages will neither fall in recessions nor rise 
in expansions 
□  □  □  □  □ 
Employees compare their wage to that of similarly qualified  workers in other 
firms in the same market  □  □  □  □  □ 
18 – NON-CORE  Has any of the following strategies ever been used in your firm to reduce labour costs?  
Please choose as many options as apply to your firm. 
Reduction or elimination of bonus payments  □ 
Reduction or elimination of non-pay benefits  □ 
Change in shift assignments   □ 
Slowdown or freeze of the rate at which promotions are filled  □ 
Recruitment of new employees (with similar skills and experience) at lower wage than those who left (e.g due to voluntary 
quits and retirement)  □ 
Use of early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower wages  □ 
Other strategies (please specify) _______________________________________________  □ 
19 – NON-CORE  Has it become easier over the last decade to adjust wages to reduce labour costs?  
Yes  □ 
No  □   → GO TO QUESTION 21 
Don’t know  □   → GO TO QUESTION 21 
20 – NON-CORE  If “yes”, why ? 
Please choose a single option, the most important reason. 
Competition has become more intense  □ 
More workers are available on the market  □ 
Trade unions have less power in collective bargaining  □ 
Employment protection has become less tight  □ 
Production is outsourced in markets where labour is cheaper  □ 
Price inflation and inflation expectations are lower and more stable  □ 
The next six questions investigate how your firm adjusts wages, prices, total costs, employment and margins to shocks. In answering, for prices please refer 
to the “main product or service, defined as the one that generated the highest fraction of turnover in the “reference year”, and for employment and wages  
please refer to the main occupational group in your firm (as identified in question 1) 
21 – How relevant are each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated slowdown in demand ? 
Please tick an option for each line. 
  not  
relevant 
of little 




Reduce prices  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce margins  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce output  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce costs  □  □  □  □  □   31  
22 – If the reduction of costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 21, please indicate the main channel through which this goal is achieved:  
Please choose a single option, the most important factor. 
Reduce base wages  □ 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc.)  □ 
Reduce the number of permanent employees   □ 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers  □ 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee  □ 
Reduce non-labour costs  □ 
23 – How relevant are each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated increase in the cost of an intermediate input (e.g. an oil price 
increase) affecting all firms in the market? 
Please tick an option for each line. 
  not  
relevant 
of little 




Increase prices  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce margins  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce output  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce other costs  □  □  □  □  □ 
24 – If the reduction of other costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 23, please indicate the main channel through which this goal is achieved:  
Please choose a single option, the most important factor. 
Reduce base wages  □ 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc )  □ 
Reduce the number of permanent employees   □ 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers  □ 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee  □ 
Reduce other non-labour costs  □ 
25 – How relevant are each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated permanent increase in wages (e.g. due to the renewal of the 
national contract) affecting all firms in the market? 
Please tick an option for each line. 
  not  
relevant 
of little 




Increase prices  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce margins  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce output  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce other costs  □  □  □  □  □ 
26 – If the reduction of other costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 25, please indicate the main channel through which this goal is achieved:  
Please choose a single option, the most important factor. 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc)  □ 
Reduce the number of permanent employees   □ 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers  □ 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee  □ 
Reduce non-labour costs  □ 
Price setting and price changes 
This section collects information on price setting and the frequency of price changes.  
If your firm produces (or sells) more than a single good or service, the answers must refer to the "main product (or service”, defined as the one that 
generated the highest fraction of your firm’s revenue in the “reference year”. For instance, if your firm produces (or sells) several types of hats and shoes, by 
"product" we mean "hats" and "shoes" (irrespective of the specific type), whereas by "main product" we mean the one that generated the highest revenue in 
the “reference year”. 
27 – What share of the revenue generated by your firm’s main product in the reference period was due to sales in: 
Domestic market  ____% 
Foreign markets  ____% 
Total ( = 100%)  100  % 
28 – How is the price of your firm’s main product set in its main market ? 
Please choose a single option. 
There is no autonomous price setting policy because:   
                                        - the price is regulated, or is set by a parent company / group  □ 
                                        - the price is set by the main customer(s)  □ 
The price is set following the main competitors  □ 
The price is set fully according to costs and a completely self-determined profit margin  □ 
Other (please specify) ___________________________________________________  □ 
29 – NON-CORE  To what extent does your firm experience price competition for its main product? 
Please choose a single one option. 
Severe competition  □ 
Strong competition  □ 
Weak competition  □ 
No competition  □ 
Don’t know / no answer  □ 
30 – Suppose that the main competitor for your firm’s main product decreases its prices; how likely is your firm to react by decreasing its own price? 
Please choose a single option. 
Very likely  □ 
Likely  □ 
Not likely  □ 
Not at all  □ 
It doesn’t apply  □ 
31 – Under normal circumstances, how often is the price of the firm’s main product typically changed? 
Please choose a single option, the one that best describes the situation in your firm 
More than once a year:   
       - daily  □ 
       - weekly  □   32  
       - monthly  □ 
       - quarterly  □ 
       - half-yearly  □ 
Once a year  □ 
Once every two years  □ 
Less frequently than once every two years  □ 
Never  □ 
There is not a defined pattern  □ 
32 – Under normal circumstances, are these price changes concentrated in any particular month / months? 
No        □ 
Yes:     Jan. □      Feb. □     Mar. □     Apr. □     May □     June □     July □     Aug. □     Sept. □     Oct. □     Nov. □     Dec. □ 
33 – How does the timing of these price changes relate to that of wage changes? 
Please choose a single option 
There is no link between the two  □ 
There is a link but no particular pattern  □ 
Decisions are taken simultaneously  □ 
Price changes tend to follow wage changes  □ 
Wage changes tend to follow price changes  □ 
Don’t know  □ 
Information about the firm 
34 – How many workers (including employees and other types of workers) did your firm have at the end of the reference period? 
Definition of employees is provided in the Appendix. Other definitions:  
Permanent full-time - those who have no set termination date, and whose regular working hours are the same as the collectively agreed or customarily worked.  
Permanent part-time - those who have no set termination date, whose working hours are less than those specified for permanent full-time.  
Temporary - those who have a set termination date or a specific period of employment.  
Number of employees:  _______________ 
of which:  
(fill in one of the two columns, as you prefer: levels or %) 
Percentages  Number 
permanent full-time   _____ %  _______________ 
permanent part-time  _____ %  _______________ 
temporary   _____ %  _______________ 
TOTAL  ( = 100%)  100     %   
Number of other types of workers (e.g. people employed by agencies, freelance, 




35 – How many employees left the firm during the reference period? 
Please refer to all types of employees: temporary and permanent, see definition in question 34. 
_______________ 
36 – How many employees joined the firm during the reference period? 
Please refer to all types of employees: temporary and permanent, see definition in question 34. 
_______________ 
37 – NON-CORE  How were your firm’s employees distributed across the following age classes at the end of the reference period? 
Less than 24 years old  _____ % 
24-54 years old  _____ % 
55-65 years old  _____ % 
>65 years old  _____ % 
TOTAL ( = 100%)  100     % 
38 – NON-CORE  How were your firm’s permanent employees distributed according to tenure at the end of the reference period? 
Less than 1 year  _____ % 
Between 1 and 5 years  _____ % 
More than 5 years  _____ % 
TOTAL ( = 100%)  100     % 
39 – NON-CORE  According to the current business register, what was the first year of operation of your firm?  
Definitions needed here (see appendix and discuss) 
_______________ 
40 – What percentage of your firm’s total costs were due to labour costs in the reference period ? 
Definitions: Total costs - all operating expenses. Labour costs - wages, salaries, bonuses, social contributions, training, tax contributions, contributions to pension 
funds 
_______ % 
41 – How was your firm’s revenue in the reference period compared to the previous year? 
Much lower   □ 
Lower  □ 
Approximately the same  □ 
Higher  □ 
Much higher  □   33
Appendix 3 – Computing expected durations 
The frequencies reported in Section 2 allow identifying the duration of prices (for the firm’s 
main product) and wages (for the firm’s typical worker) with the help of some additional 
assumptions. In the context of the survey, price and wage duration can be interpreted as the time 
interval for which these variables remain unchanged. The information collected by the survey of 
frequency of price and wage changes comes in categories, which identify points (e.g. annual 
changes correspond to 12 months duration) and intervals on the support of the duration distribution. 
While points translate directly into durations, we need a distributional assumption in order to 
impute an expected duration to each interval. Three such intervals need this assumption: a) expected 
wage duration if it is shorter than one year (frequency more than once a year); b) expected wage 
duration if it is longer than two years (frequency less than once every two years); c) expected price 
duration if it is longer than one year (frequency less than yearly).  
We assume a lognormal distribution for both wage and price durations. Note that the support 
of the lognormal is the positive real line appropriate for durations, and the shape of the histogram of 
point answers is close to the shape of a lognormal density function both for wages and prices. The 
distributional assumption is necessarily ad-hoc but it is consistent with a positive support of 
durations. At the same time, the reported large mass of probability at specific points (e.g. once a 
year that translates into 12 months exactly) is at odds with the lognormal or any other continuous 
distribution. With these caveats in mind, one should think of the duration results as being an 
approximation. 
We define durations in months. Let dw denote the duration of wages and dp that of prices. As 
already mentioned, the three durations that need to be imputed are the following: 
•  E[dw|dw<12]: expected duration for wages if duration shorter than one year; 
•  E[dw|dw>24]: expected duration for wages if duration longer than two years; 
•  E[dp|dp>12]: expected duration for prices if duration longer than one year. 
 
The information that we use the computation of expected wage duration is that on the changes 
that identify various points. We denote these points, that will serve as thresholds in the exercise,  
τwj: 
τw1= more than once a year,  
τw2= once a year,  
τw3= once every two years,  
τw4= less frequently than once every two years. 
  
These thresholds imply the following probabilities of duration intervals: 
P(dw≤11) = P(τw1) 
P(dw≤12) = P(τw1)+ P(τw2) 
P(dw≤24) = P(τw1)+ P(τw2)+P(τw3) 
P(dw>24) = P(τw4) (this last one is redundant) 
 
The analogous data for price duration with thresholds τpi are the following:24  
                                                 
24  For the imputation exercise, we collapsed the four high-frequency categories into one, for simplicity and in order to 
get identification from the upper-duration (low-frequency) part of the distribution – latter makes sense because here 
it is only the upper duration point that we want to impute. Note that it is only for the imputation exercise that  we   34
τp1=daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly 
τp2=half-yearly/twice a year,  
τp3=once a year,  
τp4= less frequently than once a year 
 
Implied probabilities of duration intervals (dp) 
P(dp≤4) = P(τp1) 
P(dp≤6) = P(τp1)+ P(τp2) 
P(dp≤12) = P(τp1)+ P(τp2)+P(τp3) 
P(dp>12) = P(τp4) (this last one is redundant) 
 
The first step is to estimate the parameters of the unconditional distributions. We assume 
lognormality so that the natural log of durations (denoted as ld) is normally distributed: 
   ldj=log(dj) ~ N(μj,σj), j=p,w.  
Then 
P(dj≤a) = P(ldj≤log(a)) = P[ (ldj–μj)/σj ≤ (log(a)–μj)/σj] = Φ[(log(a)–μj)/σj] 
 
where is the standard normal c.d.f. Take inverse of normal c.d.f. of two sides to get 
Φ
-1[P(dj≤a)] = (log(a)–μj)/σj 
 
For prices, we have four such equations, for wages, three. Both are overidentified: two 
equations would identify  μj, σj. A minimum distance or least squares approach (if unweighted) is 
numerically equivalent to taking all possible exactly identified estimates and take their average. 
Exactly identified solutions are the following: 
Φ
-1[P(d≤a)] = (log(a)–μ)/σ and   Φ
-1[P(d≤b)] = (log(b)–μ)/σ 
σ = (log(a)–μ)/ Φ
-1[P(d≤a)] 




so that  
μ = [log(b)–log(a)B/A]/[1–B/A] where A= Φ
-1[P(d≤a)] and B= Φ
-1[P(d≤b)]  
 
Data from the survey answers define fractions of firms that are estimates of each probability 
interval defined above (i.e. P(τp1)+ P(τp2)). We use employment weights and discard missing 
answers for estimating these fractions. The unconditional parameters are estimated to be the 
following: 
  for price duration: μ=2.0, σ=0.6 
  for wage duration: μ=2.4, σ=0.4 
 
Given these unconditional parameters of the lognormal distribution, we computed the conditional 
expectations by simulation and we find that these imputed conditional expectations are:  
E[dw|dw<12] = 8.3,   E[dw|dw>24] = 27.4  and   E[dp |dp>12] = 17.7 
                                                                                                                                                                  
collapsed the shorter-duration categories E[dp|dp>12], and no information was discarded for the eventual translation 
of frequencies into durations.   35
Appendix 4 – The frequency of price and wage changes: marginal effects 
The tables below show average partial effects evaluated at sample means. Such effects 
measure discrete changes in the probability of each outcome as the covariate increases by dx in the 
case of a continuous variable and by a unit 1 in the case of dummies or count variables. 
 
Table A4.1 – Frequency of price changes: marginal effects 
(col. 5 in Table 8) 
  prob. of changing price 
daily/monthly 
prob. of changing price 
quarterly/twice a year 
prob. of changing 
price yearly 
prob. of changing price 
less frequently than yearly 
Construction   0.013**   0.032**   0.061**  -0.106** 
Trade   0.025**   0.070**   0.173**  -0.268** 
Market services    0.000   0.001   0.001  -0.002 
Financial intermediation   0.021**   0.061**   0.184**  -0.266** 
Firm size 20-49   0.001   0.002   0.003  -0.006 
Firm size 50-199   0.007**   0.015**   0.020*  -0.042* 
Firm size > 200   0.009**   0.020**   0.029**  -0.058** 
AT   0.001   0.002   0.002  -0.005 
BE   0.012   0.029   0.055  -0.095 
CZ   0.000   0.001   0.001  -0.002 
ES   0.004   0.009   0.012  -0.025 
FR   0.004   0.009   0.012  -0.024 
GR   0.011**   0.025**   0.039*  -0.075** 
IE -0.003  -0.007  -0.008    0.019 
IT   0.012**   0.028**   0.050*  -0.090* 
LT   0.005   0.011   0.017  -0.033 
NL   0.020**   0.057**   0.162**  -0.240** 
PL   0.010**   0.025**   0.041*  -0.076* 
PT   0.008*   0.018*   0.029  -0.055* 
SI   0.008*   0.019*   0.029*  -0.056* 
Labour cost share  -0.023**  -0.050**  -0.063**   0.136** 
Competitive pressures   0.017**   0.038**   0.045**  -0.100** 
Export (% of sales)   0.006*   0.012*   0.016*  -0.034 
Share of white collars  -0.009**  -0.020**  -0.025**   0.054** 
Share of high skilled workers  -0.004* -0.009*  -0.011*    0.024* 
Share of full time permanent workers  -0.001  -0.003  -0.004   0.008 
Workforce turnover   0.009**   0.019**   0.024**  -0.052 
Share of bonuses on total wage bill  -0.001  -0.002  -0.003   0.006 
 
Table A4.2 – Frequency of wage changes: marginal effects 
(col. 7 in Table 9) 
  prob. of  changing wages  
more frequently than yearly 
prob. of  changing wages 
yearly 
prob. of  changing wages 
less frequently than yearly 
Construction   0.026**   0.034*  -0.060** 
Trade -0.015*  -0.013**    0.028* 
Market services   -0.017** -0.015**    0.032** 
Financial intermediation  -0.037*  -0.022**   0.059** 
Firm size 20-49   0.013*   0.014*  -0.027* 
Firm size 50-199   0.027**   0.030**  -0.057** 
Firm size > 200   0.038**   0.050**  -0.089** 
AT   0.015   0.017  -0.031 
BE -0.015  -0.012    0.026 
CZ -0.099**  -0.022**    0.121** 
ES   0.028**   0.039*  -0.068* 
FR   0.047**   0.067**  -0.114** 
GR   0.055**   0.088**  -0.143** 
IE -0.038**  -0.025**    0.063** 
LT  -0.298**   0.096**   0.202** 
NL   0.072**   0.195**  -0.267** 
PL   0.015   0.016  -0.031 
PT -0.032*  -0.021**    0.054** 
Labour cost share  -0.004  -0.003   0.007 
Competitive pressures  -0.002  -0.002   0.003 
Export (% of sales)   0.003   0.003  -0.006 
Workforce turnover   0.023**   0.022**  -0.045** 
Share of bonuses on total wage bill   0.023**   0.019**  -0.042** 
Collective agreement outside the firm   0.006   0.006  -0.013 
Collective agreement at the firm level   0.012*   0.012*  -0.024* 
Coverage of collective agreement -0.013*  -0.012*    0.025* 
EPL -0.018**  -0.017**    0.035** 
Internal policy adjusting wages to prices   0.051**   0.058**  -0.109**   36
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